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OF MICE AND “MAN”: 
PATENTABILITY OF GENETIC 
MATERIAL AND THE PROTECTION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
The patenting of genetic material raises a host of concerns such as moral 
and ethical issues, the weakening of the utility requirement and the blockage 
of downstream research. This article examines the patentability of genetic 
material in the United States, Canada and the European Union. It discusses 
the advantages and disadvantages of the current patent system in relation to 
patents on genetic material. The article concludes with suggestions regarding 
the protection of intellectual property rights in light of growing concerns.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The biotechnology industry is still in its infancy, with many breakthroughs 
on the horizon. However, even in its early stages, we have witnessed 
many improvements in technology such as cloning and the mapping of 
the human genome under the Human Genome Project. The boom in 
the biotechnology industry is considered by many to have been ignited 
by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty.
1
 This growth within the biotechnology industry, especially 
in regards to patenting genetic material, has caused many people to 
criticize the current patent system. The system is being strained by recent 
developments in technology that were never initially contemplated. 
Ikechi Mgbeoji and Byron Allen have stated that “the patent system was 
not originally designed for protection of life forms. Rather, early patent 
systems… were dominated almost exclusively by machines and mechanical 
devices.”
2
 They also mention that “as early industrialization evolved 
from machines and extended to chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and lately, 
biotechnology, the patent regime expanded its scope of patentable subject-
matter to accommodate the claims of those emergent industries.”
3
 
The intent of this paper is to examine the patentability of genetic material 
in the United States, Canada and the European Union and to discuss the 
advantages and disadvantages of the current patent system in relation to 
biotechnology. In the first section of this paper, relevant terminology will 
be defined and discussed to provide a technical background. Section II will 
examine the patentability of genetic material in the United States, Canada 
and the European Union through relevant jurisprudence and legislation. 
Concerns regarding patents on genetic materials will be examined in 
the third section. These concerns include moral and ethical issues, the 
1  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) [Chakrabarty]. 
2  Ikechi Mgbeoji & Byron Allen, “Patent First, Litigate Later! The Scramble for 
Speculative and Overly Broad Genetic Patents: Implications for Access to Health Care and 
Biomedical Research” (2003) 2 C.J.L.T. 83 at 85. 
3  Ibid. at 85.
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weakening of the utility requirement for patentability and the blocking 
of downstream research and development. The fourth section will cover 
arguments in support of granting patents on genetic material, focusing 
on the need for patent protection to increase research and development. 
The fifth section will examine possible solutions to issues proposed in 
section III, in order to reconcile those concerns with the protection of 
biotechnology products and processes.
In addition to these concerns, there are other highly contentious issues 
surrounding biotechnological patents, such as the appropriation of 
indigenous knowledge and the genetic use restriction of agricultural 
products. These issues are beyond the scope of this paper and so will not be 
covered in this analysis. Detailed discussions of these issues may be found 
in academic commentary elsewhere.4
I.  BACKGROUND 
Before engaging in a discussion dealing with highly technical terms, it is 
important to initially define the relevant terminology. For the purpose 
of this paper, genetic material includes “a gene, part of a gene, a group of 
genes, or fragment of many genes, a molecule of DNA, a fragment of DNA, 
a group of DNA molecules, or fragments of DNA molecules” and “[c]ould 
refer to anything from a small fragment of DNA to the entire genome of 
an organism.”5 A biotechnological innovation/invention will include the 
4  For a detailed discussion on the appropriation of indigenous knowledge, see: Ikechi 
Mgbeoji, “Patents and Traditional Knowledge of the Uses of Plants: Is a Communal Patent 
Regime Part of the Solution to the Scourge of Bio-Piracy?” (2001) 9 Ind. J. Global Legal 
Stud. 163. For a detailed discussion on the genetic use restriction of agricultural products, 
see: Chidi Oguamanam, “Genetic Use Restriction (or Terminator) Technologies (GURTs) 
in Agricultural Biotechnology: The Limits of Technological Alternatives to Intellectual 
Property” (2005) 4:1 C.J.L.T. 59.
5  Biology Online, Genetic Material, online: Biology Online < http://www.biology-online.
org/dictionary/Genetic_material>. 
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production or processing of the genetic material outlined in the definition 
of genetic material.6 Such innovations may take many forms, whether 
it be the development of a genetic test for diseases or the isolation and 
purification of genetic material. As will be discussed throughout this paper, 
patents on genetic sequences are quite controversial. A genetic sequence 
(also referred to as a DNA sequence) is “the precise ordering of the bases  
(A, T, G, C) from which DNA is composed.”7 The following is an example 
of a genetic sequence: 
AATGCTGATTTTGATGGA 
The function of a genetic sequence is often unknown to scientists at the 
time of patent application.8 This will be examined in section III under the 
lack of utility requirement. 
Other forms of genetic material that will be covered throughout this 
paper include expressed sequence tags (ESTs) and single nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNPs). Patents have been granted on these materials in 
the United States, Canada and the European Union.9 ESTs are defined 
as “a tiny portion of an entire gene that can be used to help identify 
unknown genes and to map their positions within a genome.”10 They 
have aided scientists to discover and isolate genes that are involved with 
many diseases, including colon cancer and Alzheimer’s disease.11 It is 
thus obvious that ESTs are important to assist with the research and 
development of innovative medicines and treatments. SNPs are also 
important in the identification of genetic diseases. They involve a variation 
6  Mona Frendo, “Intellectual Property Protection for Biological Innovations” (January 
2001) online: Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee < http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/
epic/site/cbac-cccb.nsf/en/ah00417e.html>. 
7  Webster’s New World Medical Dictionary, 2d ed. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2003) s.v. “DNA 
sequence”. 
8  Mgbeoji & Allen, supra note 2 at 86.
9  Ibid. 
10  A Science Primer, Just the Facts: A Basic Introduction to the Science Underlying NCBI 
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within a gene that can be linked to the development of certain diseases. 
Researchers believe that a genetic predisposition to a disease is not caused 
by one single nucleotide variation; however, SNPs over stretches of DNA 
may allow them to associate an SNP with a particular disease trait.12 It 
is also believed that SNPs are “useful in helping researchers determine 
and understand why individuals differ in their ability to absorb drugs…. 
Therefore, the recent discovery of SNPs promises to revolutionize not only 
the process of disease detection but also the practice of preventive and 
curative medicine.”13 Other technical terms are included throughout this 
paper and are defined in their relevant sections. 
II.  PATENTABILITY OF GENETIC MATERIAL  
IN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA AND  
THE EUROPEAN UNION 
A. Patentability of Genetic Material in the United States 
In the United States, patentable subject matter is covered under the 
U.S. Patent Act, Title 35, § 101.14 This section states that “[w]hoever 
invents or discovers any new or useful process, machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, 
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements 
of this title.”15 This is, of course, subject to the requirements of novelty, 
non-obviousness and utility. These three requirements are not unique to 
the United States; they are a common feature of patent laws throughout 
the world. This section will focus on the development of U.S. patent law 
in relation to the patentability of genetic material through examining 
12  A Science Primer, Just the Facts: A Basic Introduction to the Science Underlying NCBI 
Resources, SNPs: Variations on a Theme, online: National Center for Biotechnology 
Information 
< http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/snps.html>. 
13  Ibid. 
14  35 U.S.C. § 101. 
15  Ibid. 
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the groundbreaking Diamond v. Chakrabarty case, as well as patent 
applications for the Harvard Oncomouse and an invention of a half-
human, half-animal creature. 
1. Anything Under the Sun Made by Man 
The leading case in the United States regarding patentable subject matter is 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty. Ananda Mohan Chakrabarty, a genetic engineer 
working for General Electric, developed a micro-organism that possessed 
the ability to decompose crude oil. Mr. Chakrabarty applied for a patent 
but was initially rejected by the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) and by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences 
on appeal. He then appealed to the United States Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals. The Court allowed the appeal; however, the Commissioner 
of Patents and Trademarks appealed to the Supreme Court of the United 
States. In a 5-4 decision in 1980, the Court affirmed the previous decision 
and held that “[a] live, human-made micro-organism is patentable subject 
matter under § 101. [The] respondent’s micro-organism constitutes 
a ‘manufacture’ or ‘composition of matter’ within that statute.”16 In its 
decision, the Court held that when codifying the U.S. patent laws in 1952, 
congress intended patentable subject matter to include “anything under 
the sun that is made by man.”17 The decision in Chakrabarty caused great 
controversy throughout the biotechnology industry and academia. Many 
people criticized the decision by arguing that it would not provide a barrier 
to the patenting of “higher forms of life – such as plants, animals, and 
possibly human beings.”18 The following two paragraphs will examine two 
applications of the Chakrabarty standard: one where the USPTO granted a 
patent on a mouse, and another where it denied a patent on human beings. 
2. Mice, Man and Humanzee? 
In 1988, the USPTO granted a patent to Harvard College for the Harvard 
Oncomouse. An Oncomouse is a transgenic mouse that has been genetically 
16  Chakrabarty, supra note 1. 
17  Ibid. 
18  Daniel J. Kelves & Ari Berkowitz, “The Gene Patenting Controversy: A Convergence of 
Law, Economic Interests, and Ethics” (2002) 67 Brook. L. Rev. 233 at 234. 
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modified to carry an oncogene (a gene that contributes to the development 
of cancer) in order to further cancer research.19 Genetically manipulating 
animals raises a host of ethical questions such as animal cruelty, as well as 
raising the issue of whether the patent meets the requirements of novelty, non-
obviousness and utility. In coming to its conclusion, it appears that the USPTE 
did not consider ethical issues to be a relevant factor. Nonetheless, the USPTO 
ruled that humans would be excluded from patentability because of “moral 
and legal concerns about patents on human beings, and about modification 
of the human genome.”20 The subsequent sections dealing with patentability 
of genetic material in Canada and the European Union will demonstrate how 
the Oncomouse patent application received more scrutiny in those respective 
jurisdictions than it did in the United States. 
In an attempt to spur the debate on morality of biotechnology, social 
activist Jeremy Rifkin and scientist Stuart Newman subsequently applied 
for patent protection for the invention of a half-human, half-animal 
labelled the “Humanzee.”21 In 1998, the USPTO issued one of its many 
rejections on the basis that the claim “embraced a human being”, therefore, 
rendering its subject matter unpatentable.22 The USPTO issued the 
following statement in one rejection of the invention: 
The presence of some nonhuman primate cells does not 
make a human embryo nonhuman… Contrary to the 
argument that the claimed animal was never exclusively  
human in origin, i.e., that the chimeric embryo never 
existed as a human embryo, the specification states: “the 
invention relates to chimeric embryos and chimeric 
animals created from human embryos.”… The Office does 
not agree that humans are patentable  subject matter.23 
19  WIPO Magazine, “Bioethics and Patent Law: The Case of the Oncomouse” WIPO 
(June 2006), online: WIPO <http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2006/03/
article_0006.html >. 
20  Ibid. 
21  Brock Heathcotte & Jason Scott Robert, “The Strange Case of the Humanzee Patent 
Quest” (2006) National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 51 at 52. 
22  Ibid. at 53. 
23 Ibid. at 53. 
Of Mice and “Man”100 2009
A chimera is an animal with genetic material from two or more species. 
Combining genetic material from a human and an animal is clearly 
an ethical concern. The decisions by the USPTO in both the Harvard 
Oncomouse and Humanzee patent applications demonstrate that 
patentable subject matter does not extend to human beings. Through an 
examination of those patent applications, as well as the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Chakrabarty, it is evident that patentable subject matter under 
U.S. patent law includes the fundamental building blocks of genetic 
material, including gene sequences, ESTs, SNPs and higher life forms such 
as plants and animals.
 
B. Patentable Subject Matter: The Canadian Debate
Canadian patent law is governed by the Patent Act.24 Section 2 of the Act 
outlines patentable subject matter; it states that an “‘invention’ means any 
new and useful art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement in any art, process, machine, 
manufacture or composition of matter.”25  As in the U.S., in order to be 
granted a patent in Canada, an invention must be novel and non-obvious, 
and must have utility. The Canadian Patent Act is similar to U.S. patent law 
under Title 35; however, Canada and the U.S. have different conceptions of 
acceptable patentable subject matter. The difference in the patentability of 
genetic material will be examined by exploring Canadian jurisprudence. 
The two major cases that have outlined patentable subject matter in 
Canada are Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents)26 and 
Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser.27 
24  Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4. 
25  Ibid. at s. 2. 
26  Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), 2002 SCC 76, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 
[Harvard College]. 
27  Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, 2004 SCC 34, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 [Monsanto]. 
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1. Higher Life Forms vs. Lower Life Forms 
The Harvard College case resulted from the rejection of the patent 
application for the Harvard Oncomouse by the Canadian Patent Office. 
The decision was appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal where the appeal 
was allowed; however, that decision was appealed to the Supreme Court 
of Canada (SCC).28 In a 5-4 decision, the SCC overturned the Federal 
Court of Appeal’s decision and rejected the patent. The SCC held that the 
transgenic mouse constituted a higher life form and that higher life forms 
are not patentable subject matter under the s. 2 definition of inventions, 
thereby departing from the U.S. position.29 Justice Bastarache, for the 
majority, held that he: 
[C]annot…agree with the suggestion that the definition 
is unlimited in the sense that it includes “anything under 
the sun that is made by man”. In drafting the Patent 
Act, Parliament chose to adopt an exhaustive definition 
that limits invention to any “art, process, machine, 
manufacture or composition of matter”. Parliament did 
not define “invention” as “anything new and useful made 
by man”. By choosing to define invention in this way, 
Parliament signalled a clear intention to include certain 
subject matter as patentable and to exclude other subject 
matter as being outside the confines of the Act. This 
should be kept in mind when determining whether the 
words “manufacture” and “composition of matter” include 
higher life forms.30 
The majority held that “the Court does not possess the institutional 
competence to deal with issues of this complexity” and that it should be up 
to Parliament to decide whether higher life forms may be patented.31 
 
28  WIPO, supra note 19. 
29  Harvard College, supra note 26. 
30  Ibid. at para. 158.
31  Ibid. at para. 183.
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The dissenting judges agreed with the majority that the decision to 
include higher life forms under patentable subject matter should be left 
to Parliament. However, they stated that “neither the Commissioner of 
Patents nor the Court have the authority to declare, in effect, a moratorium 
on [higher] life form patents until Parliament chooses to act.”32 The dissent 
found no requirement in the Patent Act for examining public order and 
morality, nor any provisions excluding the patentability of higher life 
forms. 
2. In Reverse, but not Reversal 
The dissent in Harvard College paved the way for the SCC’s backtracking 
in Monsanto. In this case, Monsanto Canada Inc. (Monsanto) sued farmer 
Percy Schmeiser over his unlicensed used of Monsanto’s seed which was 
marketed as Roundup Ready Canola. The seed contained a gene patented 
by Monsanto that aids in controlling weeds because it prevents crops 
from being damaged by certain herbicides. In Monsanto the SCC split 
5-4 and found that Mr. Schmeiser infringed Monsanto’s patent under s. 
42 of the Patent Act. The essence of the majority decision was that even 
though a higher life form cannot be patented, the patent protection for the 
genetic material that makes up the higher life form may extend to protect 
the higher life form itself. The Court’s decision in Monsanto therefore 
marked a departure from the Court’s line of reasoning in Harvard College. 
However, it was not a reversal of its previous decision, at least in the eyes 
of the Court. One of the reasons for the Court’s departure may have been 
its change of personnel. Justices Gonthier and L’Heureux-Dubé of the 
majority in Harvard College had retired from the Court, while Justices Fish 
and Deschamps joined the Court and aligned with majority in Monsanto. 
The current position on the patentability of genetic material is that higher 
life forms still cannot be patented but the “fundamental building blocks 
of the human body – DNA, RNA, proteins and genes – can be patented 
in Canada if they meet the statutory criteria of novelty, utility and non-
obviousness.”33 In order to receive a patent on a genetic sequence, it must 
32  Ibid. at para. 114.
33  Frendo, supra note 6. 
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be isolated or purified from its natural source within the body and it must 
meet the requirements for non-obviousness and utility.34 This position was 
upheld in the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Harvard College and was 
affirmed upon appeal to the SCC; it was also upheld in the SCC’s decision 
in Monsanto. 
C. Patenting of Genetic Material in the European Union:  
A Moral Decision? 
The patenting of genetic material in the European Union has been quite 
controversial. As in Canada and the U.S., one of the most controversial 
patent applications has been for the Harvard Oncomouse. As discussed 
above, the patent had previously been granted in the United States 
and would later be rejected in Canada. Harvard College filed a patent 
application in 1985. The application was rejected by the European 
Patent Office (EPO) in 1989 on numerous grounds, one of them being a 
“European prohibition against the patenting of animals.”35 The Oncomouse 
patent was not initially rejected for being contrary to “ordre public” or 
morality under article 53(a) of the European Patent Convention (EPC). 
Article 53(a) states that: 
European patents shall not be granted in respect of:  
(a) inventions the publication or exploitation of which 
would be contrary to “ordre public” or morality, provided 
the exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary  
merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in 
some or all of the Contracting States.36 
The decision by the Examining Division of the EPO was appealed to the 
Board of Appeals, where the Board decided that the Examining Division 
34  Ibid. 
35  Baruch Brody, “Intellectual Property and Biotechnology: The European Debate” (2007) 
17:2 Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 69 at 91. 
36  Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention), Oct. 5, 
1973, 13 I.L.M. 268, Article 53. 
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erred in rejecting the Oncomouse patent.37 The Board of Appeal sent the 
case back to the Examining Division in 1992 and provided it with a three 
part test to examine the patentability issue in order to reconcile it with 
Article 53 of the EPC. The test consisted of the balancing of risks and 
detrimental effects associated with an invention against its benefits. The 
three interests the Examining Division considered were: “(1) the interest in 
remedying human disease, (2) the interest in protecting the environment 
from the uncontrolled spread of unwanted genes, and (3) the interest in 
avoiding cruelty to animals.”38 In 1992, the Examining Division granted the 
patent on the transgenic mouse stating that: 
In the overall balance the Examining Division concluded 
that the present invention cannot be considered immoral 
and contrary to public order. The provision of a type of 
test animal useful in cancer research and giving rise to 
a reduction in the amount of testing on animals… can 
generally be regarded as being beneficial to mankind.39 
Over the next 12 years, the Examining Division’s decision was challenged on 
numerous occasions. In July 2004, the EPO issued its final decision on the 
Harvard Oncomouse patent by upholding the patent, but limiting it to mice.40 
Throughout the time period that the Oncomouse patent was challenged, the 
European Parliament and European Council worked on a biotechnology 
directive to address the patentability of biotechnological inventions, 
including genetic material. This directive will be examined in what follows.
1. European Biotechnology Directive, 98/44/EC 
On July 6, 1998, the European Parliament and European Council issued 
the European Directive 98/44/EC on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological 
37  Brody, supra note 35 at 91. 
38  Margo A. Bagley, “Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in 
Patent Law” (2003) 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 469 at 520. 
39  Jaenichen, H., The European Patent Office’s Case Law on the Patentability of 
Biotechnology Inventions, (Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1993), cited in Brody, supra note 
44 at 94. 
40  Brody, supra note 35 at 98. 
Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 105Vol. 18
Inventions.41 The issuance of the Directive was met with criticism by many 
of the EU member states. Within three months, the government of the 
Netherlands challenged the Directive. It argued that the Directive should be 
annulled because it was too vague regarding whether patents would be denied 
based on ethical grounds. It also argued that the Directive allowed patents to 
be granted on isolated genetic material, which it considered to be a violation 
of human dignity.42 In 2001, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) rejected 
the Dutch government’s challenge, confirming the validity of the Directive 
and stating that both Article 5 and Article 6 of the Directive addressed Dutch 
concerns about human dignity and public morality.43 The Court acknowledged 
that Article 5 appropriately addresses the concerns about human dignity by 
excluding certain elements of the human body from patentability:44 
Article 5  
1. The human body, at the various stages of its formation 
and development, and the simple discovery of one of its 
elements, including the sequences or partial sequence of a  
gene, cannot constitute patentable inventions. 
2. An element isolated from the human body or otherwise 
produced by means of a technical process, including the 
sequence or partial sequences of a gene, may constitute a  
patentable invention, even if the structure of that element 
is identical to that of a natural element. 
3. The industrial application of a sequence or partial 
sequence of a gene must be disclosed  in the patent 
application.45 
Article 6 of the Directive was aimed at giving effect to ethical concerns 
41  Council Directive (EC) 98/44 of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological 
inventions [1998] OJ L213/13 [Directive]. 
42  Duncan Curley and Andrew Sharples, “Patenting Biotechnology in Europe: The Ethical 
Debate Moves On” (2002) 12 Eur. I.P. Rev. 565 at 565-566. 
43  Conference Report, “The Trials and Tribulations of the Biotech Patent Directive” 
Academy of European Law (July 2006), online: Academy of European Law <http://www.
era.int/web/de/resources/5_1095_2867_file_en.3961.pdf>. 
44  Ibid. 
45  Directive, supra note 41 at Article 5. 
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about the patenting of certain genetic material: 
Article 6  
1. Inventions shall be considered unpatentable where 
their commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre 
public or morality; however, exploitation shall not be 
deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited 
by law or regulation. 
2. On the basis of paragraph 1, the following, in particular, 
shall be considered unpatentable:  
(a) processes for cloning human beings;  
(b) processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity  
      of human beings;  
(c) uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial  
      purposes;  
(d) processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals  
      which are likely to cause them suffering without any  
      substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and also  
      animals resulting from such processes.46 
Despite the ECJ ruling, the Directive remained controversial. By 2003, 
only eleven European Union member states had adopted the Directive.47 
France initially refused to adopt the Directive because of concerns over 
the patentability of genetic sequences without actual proof of their utility.48 
However, in 2004, both France and the Netherlands, two of the most vocal 
of the opponents to the Directive, implemented the Directive into their 
national patent law.49 Despite the reluctance by many of the nations over 
concerns about morality and utility, all European Union members had 
46  Ibid. at Article 6. 
47  European Commission, “State of Play of the Implementation of Directive 98/44/EC” 
(15 January 2007), online: European Commission < http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
indprop/docs/invent/state-of-play_en.pdf>. 
48  Matthias Herdegen, Patenting Human Genes and Other Parts of the Human Body under 
EC Biotechnology Directive, online: Pharmalicensing.com 
< http://pharmalicensing.com/public/articles/view/1008262393_3c18dcf915ce1>. 
49  European Commission, supra note 47. 
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adopted the Directive by 2007.50 
III.  CONCERNS REGARDING THE PATENTING OF 
GENETIC MATERIAL 
Altering the genetic make-up of humans, animals and plants raises many 
ethical issues. In an article published in the Ottawa Citizen in 1994, 
“The Biology Business,” some of the general concerns that were raised 
include the threat of “genetic accidents,” the use of animals in research  
experimentation, genetic discrimination and the patenting of animal 
species or genes.51 As mentioned previously, some of these concerns are 
considered during the patent assessment process in the European Union. 
On a deeper level, many more issues arise when addressing the question 
of the patentability of genetic material. Some major concerns regarding 
include the weakening of the utility requirement, the question of whether 
such patents are contrary to morality, and the concern that granting 
patents on genetic material will hinder biotechnological research rather 
than advance it. 
A. Weakening of the Utility Requirement 
One major concern regarding the patentability of genetic materials is that 
patents may be issued without fully satisfying the utility requirement. 
There is a “growing concern among patent lawyers and policy-makers 
that the major patent offices of the world are relatively lax and permissive 
in issuing patents on biotechnological products without showing 
demonstrable utility.”52 As mentioned previously, this was one of the many 
50  Ibid. 
51  “The Biology Business” The Ottawa Citizen (8 January 1994), cited in Hartley 
Gorenstein, “The Regulation of Biotechnology in Canada: Social and Moral Issues” (1996) 
2 Medical Law International 169, at 176-177. 
52  Mgbeoji & Allen, supra note 2 at 83. 
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complaints that EU member nations made about the Directive. If one were 
to compare patents on mechanical and biotechnological inventions, it is 
arguable that biotechnological patents are examined more favourably when 
it comes to meeting the utility requirement. Mgbeoji and Allen suggest that 
“[i]t is common knowledge that the patent offices would not issue patents 
to mechanical inventions of dubious or uncertain utility. There is no reason 
why a comparative attitude or stance should not be interpreted with respect 
of genetic patents.”53 
Patents on genetic sequences as well as ESTs and SNPs have been granted 
in the United States, Canada and other international jurisdictions. Many 
of these patents have been granted without fully meeting the utility 
requirement. Patent offices have granted patents based on the homology 
of a sequence rather than a proven use.54 Homology refers to the similarity 
between two distinct things based on their common origin.55 In relation to 
genetic sequence patents, a patent would be issued on a genetic sequence 
based on its being homologous to another sequence that has a specific use. 
One reason why these patents may not meet the utility requirements is that 
“a difference in a single base pair in a gene sequence can have important 
functional implications.”56 There has been some effort to reiterate the 
importance for a genetic material invention to have a specific utility before 
receiving patent protection. Article 5(3) of the Directive addresses the issue 
of genetic sequences by stating that the industrial application must be 
disclosed in the patent application. However, many efforts like these have 
failed in preventing the granting of patents that lack utility. 
53  Ibid. at 90. 
54  Ibid. at 86. 
55  Dictionary.com, s.v. “homology”, online: Dictionary.com  < http://dictionary.reference.
com/browse/homology>. 
56  David Dickson, “NIH Opposes Plans for Patenting ‘Similar’ Gene Sequences” (2002) 
405 Nature 3, cited in Mgbeoji & Allen, supra note 2 at 86.
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B. Contrary to Public Morality 
This concern is perhaps the most widely published in relation to the 
patentability of genetic material. Both proponents and opponents of 
genetic biotechnology recognize that a host of ethical issues arise. Harley 
Gorenstein suggested that “[t]he rapid advancement of biotechnology 
raises profound questions about how society will deal with social, 
moral, environmental and ethical issues arising from new and powerful 
techniques to manipulate life.”57 Margo Bagley points out in her article, 
“Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent 
Law,” that there are no statutory morality requirements under U.S. patent 
law and that the patent system is one of “patent first, ask questions later.”58 
She recommends that a new system should be adopted to deal with the 
ethical concerns of genetic material patents. Despite the concerns that 
have arisen over the past thirty years, patent offices around the world have 
“continued to award patent rights over DNA sequences and other products 
of biotechnology while [the] academic and social debate [continues to] 
rage.”59 
C. Genetic Material Patents:  
“A Tragedy of the Anticommons”60 
One of the greatest concerns associated with patenting genetic material, 
especially the fundamental building blocks of the human genome 
including DNA sequences and ESTs, is the possible concomitant restriction 
on downstream research and development. These types of basic genetic 
material can be viewed as the platform for biotechnological research. The 
57  Harley Gorenstein, “The Regulation of Biotechnology in Canada: Social and Moral 
Issues” (1996) 2 Medical Law International 169 at 169. 
58  Bagley, supra note 38 at 494. 
59  Richard E. Gold & Alain Gallochat, “The European Biotech Directive: Past As Prologue” 
(2001) 7 Eur. L.J. 331, cited in Richard E. Gold, “From Theory to Practice: Health Care and 
the Patent System” (2003) Health L.J. Special Edition 21 at 30. 
60  The phrase “A Tragedy of the Anticommons” was established in an article by Michael 
A. Heller, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx 
to Markets” (1998) 111 Harv. L. Rev. 621, then used by Michael Heller and Rebecca 
Eisenberg in an article titled “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research” (1998) 280:5363 Science 698. 
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material once existed under a commons model, meaning many researchers 
had relatively unrestricted access to it. However, the commons model 
for biotechnological research that existed in the second half of the 20th 
century has been pushed aside in favour of the current privatized system 
of biotechnological research.61 This section will examine the anticommons 
theory and how it relates to the patenting of genetic material. 
In an article titled, “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research,” Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg discuss a 
theory put forward by Garret Hardin, which stated that a “tragedy of the 
commons” occurs when there is an overuse of common resources.62 On 
the contrary, the anticommons involves the underuse of a scarce resource 
because too many people have been granted an exclusive right and have 
the ability to prevent its use by others.63 The tragedy of the anticommons 
has become a more pressing concern because of the shift from the 
commons model to a privatized scheme marked by private investment 
rather than governmental sponsorship.64 More funding is received by the 
biotechnology firms because of the privatization of the industry. However, 
“privatization can go astray when too many owners hold rights in previous 
discoveries that constitute obstacles to future research.”65 
As mentioned in the introduction to this section, the obstacle caused by 
patenting genetic material is that downstream technology and improvements 
may be prevented because exclusive patents are granted on platform 
innovations. One example of the effects on downstream research is a 
phenomenon known as a patent thicket, which involves “[a]n overlapping 
set of patent rights requiring those seeking to commercialize new technology 
[to] obtain licenses from multiple patentees.”66 The problem caused by patent 
thickets is that it may be too costly to obtain licenses from each firm that 
61  Mgbeoji & Allen, supra note 2 at 88. 
62  Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 60 at 698. 
63  Ibid. 
64  Ibid. 
65  Ibid. 
66  Cambridge Health Institute, “Biopharmaceutical Law & Intellectual Property Glossary 
and Taxonomy” (22 October 2007), online: Cambridge Health Institute  
< http://www.genomicglossaries.com/content/intellectual_property.asp>. 
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owns individual patents.  Innovative products are delayed due to licensing 
issues. Not only does the tragedy of the anticommons have an effect on 
the commercialization of revolutionary medicines; it also has an effect 
on applied research. Researchers may be less willing to conduct research in 
areas that are covered by patents.67 Another issue that occurs is that many 
laboratories are prevented from performing tests to discover genetic diseases 
or the predisposition to those diseases because it is too costly.68 Solutions to 
these problems are examined in section V. 
IV.  IMPORTANCE OF GENETIC MATERIAL PATENTS
 
Notwithstanding concerns over the patenting of genetic material, the 
patent system was developed as a reward system to promote innovation. 
Innovation in biotechnology has the potential to lead to groundbreaking 
inventions that may contribute to improved health care and human 
development. Schulman suggested that “[w]hile patenting DNA runs 
the risk of diminishing respect for human dignity, some risk might be 
acceptable if the end result were an increase in human well-being.”69 This 
was the result that can be seen in the Harvard Oncomouse patent case 
examined by the EPO. Ethical concerns may be overlooked if the benefit 
to mankind outweighs the detrimental effects of a certain invention. 
Additionally, it is believed that without the reward conferred by patent 
protection of genetic material, investors would be reluctant to invest 
in biotechnological and pharmaceutical firms for the development of 
new technologies and drugs.70 This would have an unfavourable effect 
on society. However, this does not mean that ethical and developmental 
67  Mgbeoji & Allen, supra note 2 at 87. 
68  Ibid. 
69  Miriam Schulman, “Of SNPS, TRIPS and Human Dignity: Ethics and Gene Patenting” 
Markkula Center for Applied Ethics online: Santa Clara University 
< http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/submitted/schulman/genepatenting.html>. 
70  Ibid. 
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concerns should be ignored.71 Consideration must be given to where the 
bar is set. “[I]f the bar is set too high… pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
companies will not put the vast sums necessary into research because 
they will have no way to protect their investment.”72 On the other hand, 
if the bar is set too low, society will run the risk of over patenting genetic 
materials which will lead to a “tragedy of the anticommons.” 
A. Biotechnology is Booming 
In an article published by the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO), “Bioethics and Patent Law: The Relaxin Case”, it was stated 
that “[b]iotechnology is booming. Innovation in biotech is producing 
new medicines, treatments and processes with the potential to save 
or transform the lives of millions.”73 The biotechnology industry has 
contributed to the development of over 200 new vaccines and products, as 
well as 400 others that are in clinical trials, with the majority of those being 
targeted at devastating diseases such as AIDS, cancer and heart disease.74 In 
the World Health Organization’s (WHO) 2004 world health report, these 
three diseases were listed in the top ten diseases throughout the world.75 It 
is imperative that patents are granted to support the intellectual property 
rights of the companies that produce these new medicines, treatments and 
processes. The research and development of genetic material products and 
processes is incredibly expensive. In 2006, approximately $29 billion was 
spent on research and development within the industry.76 In receiving a 
patent on genetic material, biotechnology firms are given exclusive rights 
71  Ibid. 
72  Ibid. 
73  WIPO Magazine, “Bioethics and Patent Law: The Relaxin Case” WIPO (April 2006), 
online: WIPO <http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2006/02/article_0009.html >. 
74  Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), Biotechnology Industry Facts, online: 
Biotechnology Industry Organization < http://www.bio.org/speeches/pubs/er/statistics.
asp>. 
75  WHO, The World Health Report 2004 (Geneva: WHO, 2004). 
76  Battelle Technology Partnership Practice, Technology, Talent and capital: State 
Bioscience Initiatives 2008, online: BIO at ES-3 < http://bio.org/local/battelle2008/State_
Bioscience_Initiatives_2008.pdf>. 
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over the material and so become more attractive to private investors.77 
In 2006, the biotechnology industry received more than $24.8 billion 
in private investments.78 Larger biotechnology firms are not the only 
ones that require substantial amounts of funding to conduct pioneering 
research. Start-up companies, with the potential to commercialize 
similar biotechnology products, rely on venture capitalists to fund their 
research and development. However, “[v]enture capitalists generally 
require a potential for exceptionally high rates of return in exchange for 
funding.”79 Patents on genetic materials are therefore required to secure 
investment. Without patent protection, potentially life-saving medicines 
and treatments would not be commercialized. Venture capitalists provide 
approximately one third of the funding towards biotechnology firms. In 
2007 alone, venture capitalists contributed a total of $11.6 billion towards 
biotechnology firms, which was an increase of $600 million from 2000.80
 
V.  SUGGESTIONS FOR RECONCILING THE  
PATENT SYSTEM WITH THE PATENTING  
OF GENETIC MATERIAL 
Since the biotechnology industry is still in its early stages, it is important 
to consider some of the solutions that have been proposed to address the 
problems identified above. Heller and Eisenberg suggest that “[p]olicy-makers 
should seek to ensure coherent boundaries of upstream patents and to 
minimize restrictive licensing practices that interfere with downstream 
product development. Otherwise, more upstream rights may lead 
paradoxically to fewer useful products for improving human health.”81 
77  Michael S. Mireles, “An Examination of Patents, Licensing Research Tools, and the 
Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology Innovation” (2004) 38 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 
141 at 154.
78  BIO, supra note 74. 
79  Mireles, supra note 77 at 163. 
80  Battelle, supra note 76 at ES-3. 
81  Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 60 at 701. 
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This section will discuss some of the potential suggestions to the current 
problem faced by the industry, including patent pooling, stronger utility 
requirements and the development of new research exemptions. 
A. Patent Pooling and Cross-Licensing 
One particular way in which patent thickets may be prevented is through 
the development of a patent pooling system. This system would involve the 
“pooling” of intellectual property rights possessed by each biotechnology 
firm facilitated by a cross-licensing scheme which would provide a 
greater opportunity for researchers to take advantage of their access to a 
wide range of patented genetic materials.82 Patent pooling systems have 
proven to be successful in many other technological areas including 
the automobile, semi-conductor and the aircraft industries.83 Licensing 
schemes have even been successful in a small sector of the biotechnology 
industry, which is evident from licensing agreements that existed between 
Stanford University, Cohen and Boyer and also other licensees.84 Even 
though patent pooling is an attractive and viable option for the industry, 
there are concerns over the outcome of these pools. One major concern 
is that patent pooling will encourage anti-competitive behaviour between 
firms, which could result in higher costs to consumers.85 In response 
to this concern, the U.S. Department of Justice issued guidelines to be 
followed before a patent pool will be approved: “[t]he pool applicants 
are restricted from aggregating competing technologies for the purpose 
of anticompetitive pricing…and the patent pool participants must not 
attempt to affect market prices on downstream products.”86 Failing an 
industry-wide patent pooling system, cross-licensing schemes may 
be promoted between two separate biotechnology firms. The benefits 
conferred on researchers would be limited to the firms involved with 
the agreement; however, it is still a step in the right direction, that is, a 
82  Mgbeoji & Allen, supra note 2 at 93. 
83  Graham Reynolds, Nanotechnology and the Tragedy of the Anticommons: Towards a 
Strict Utility Requirement [unpublished] at 61. 
84  Mgbeoji & Allen, supra note 2 at 94. 
85  Ibid. at 94. 
86  Ibid. at 94. 
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step away from the restriction placed on research and development by 
anticommons and patent thickets. 
B. Stronger Utility Requirements 
As mentioned above, the current patent system is being chipped away at 
because of the lax utility requirements for patents on genetic materials. 
Patent offices throughout the world should enforce stronger utility 
requirements before issuing patents on biotechnology inventions. Stringent 
utility requirements benefit downstream research because they prevent 
the abundant overlapping of claims over genetic sequences without those 
claims’ having been proved useful.87 A more stringent utility requirement 
will also ensure that society will receive the benefit of the patented 
invention while the inventor retains the right to exclude others and to 
recoup their investment.88 Since genetic sequences and ESTs have been 
patented based on homologous grounds, patent applications for many 
these genetic materials may be rejected if they are subjected to more 
rigorous utility requirements. 
C. Fair Use and Research Exemptions 
Similarly to copyright law in Canada and the U.S., a fair use exemption 
has been suggested to help researchers overcome the anticommons 
problems that exist.89 Professor Maureen O’Rourke argued that fair use 
may be used to “excuse infringement by researchers attempting to invent 
around the patent even when the eventual end product is to be marketed 
commercially.”90 As with copyright law, the fair use exemption is used as a 
defence to infringement of copyright or it may be used as a user’s right. If 
it is classified only as a defence, it would be a reactionary measure which 
would put more of a strain on the court system and may cause researchers 
87  Ibid. at 89. 
88  Mireles, supra note 77 at 195. 
89  Ibid. at 201. 
90  Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1177 (2000) at 1238.
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to second guess whether that excuse may apply to them. The major 
difference between copyright law and patent law is that receiving copyright 
protection is relatively costless, while the process for obtaining a patent 
is costly.91 A fair use doctrine may not be the ideal alternative to alleviate 
concerns regarding genetic material patents, but it does have the potential 
to prevent the stifling of research and development. 
Perhaps a more appropriate method would be for legislatures in all 
jurisdictions to adopt a broader scope for the research exemption. In 2002, 
the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee (CBAC) recommended 
that the Canadian Patent Act be amended to include the following 
provision: 
It is not an infringement of a patent to use a patented 
process or product either:  
 Privately and for non-commercial processes, or  
 To study the subject-matter of the patented  
 invention to investigate its properties ,improve  
 upon it, or create a new product or process.92 
Adoption of the CBAC’s recommendations would provide researchers 
with more leverage when using patented genetic material.93 At the same 
time, adoption of these recommendations would grant researchers more 
certainty when dealing with patented subject matter. This would contribute 
to the advancement of more applied research and development beyond 
the initial platform stage. However, there are objections to the research 
exemption suggestion. It may result in a reduction of disclosures for 
genetic material research tools such as ESTs and SNPs,94 which, in turn, 
would be detrimental to the development of applied research. Therefore, 
if legislatures attempt to amend research exemptions, they must be 
cautious in their approach, in order to avoid contributing to the tragedy 
of the anticommons. Although academics believe that a broader research 
91  Mireles, supra note 77 at 204. 
92  Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee. Patenting Higher Life Forms and 
Related Issues (Ottawa: CABC, 2002), cited in Mgbeoji & Allen, supra note 2 at 93. 
93  Mgbeoji & Allen, supra note 2 at 93. 
94  Mireles, supra note 77 at 216. 
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exemption is better than a fair use exemption, patent pooling, which would 
provide the biotechnology firms with more of an opportunity to recover 
their investment through a licensing system, seems to be the preferable 
route of reform.95 
CONCLUSION 
It is evident that biotechnology patents on genetic material are essential 
to help promote the research and development of groundbreaking 
medicines, treatments and procedures. Many academics believe that 
“[t]he field of biotechnology and biomedicine is at an early stage and 
its immense promise should not be aborted by a lax interpretation and 
application of contemporary laws.”96 The current patent system must 
therefore be improved in order to prevent the blockage of future research 
and development, while balancing the need to reward innovation and thus 
encourage it. 
95  Ibid. at 216. 
96  Mgbeoji & Allen, supra note 2 at 95. 
